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Abstract
This paper deals with Nancy Cartwright’s views on the measurement
problem in Quantum Mechanics, as exposed in her book How the Laws
of Physics Lie. She does not accept the logic of Quantum Mechanics.
It is argued that her proposals, which are at variance with many facts
results and epistemics of Quantum Mechanics are the result of her choice
of classical logic, which leads her to propose the transition rate as the
fundamental object of Quantum Mechanics. I argue that this is incorrect.
The positions which Nancy Cartwright defends on the reduction of the
wave packet do not address the fundamental issue, i.e. the duality of a
world where quantum and classical objects coexist and interact. I suggest
that the main problem with Nancy Cartwright’s positions is her difficulty
in accepting that the contradiction at the basis of QuantumMechanics, i.e.
the simultaneous corpuscular and wave-like nature of quantum objects, is
a fact of nature. Recent experiments, described in this paper, shed a
new light on the foundations of Quantum Mechanics and on the topic
of this paper. The limits of the no-contradiction principle are discussed;
modern dialectical materialism is argued to offer a useful framework for
the interplay between knowledge and reality.
1 Introduction
Classical physics is based on the notion of trajectory of a material object. A
complete description of the latter is obtained when all coordinates and mo-
menta of all its parts are simultaneously given. Non Linear Classical Mechanics
has added to the classical notion of a trajectory that of the chaotic character
of certain solutions of the equations of motion, whereby sensitivity to initial
conditions turns trajectories in deterministic but unpredictable ones.
At the basis of the necessity to abandon classical physics is the observation
that atoms are stable. In classical physics, electrons orbiting around a nucleus
would radiate electromagnetic waves continuously, and collapse on the nucleus:
atoms would not be stable.
Another basic experimental observation is that a sufficiently focused elec-
tron beam with convenient energy, if hitting a crystal, leads to an interference
pattern on a screen, much like that observed for the diffraction figure of elec-
tromagnetic waves. Thus, under certain conditions, the behaviour of material
particles exhibits wave-like features. This phenomenon is radically at variance
with the classical notion that a corpuscular (discontinuous) entity cannot have
a wave like (continuous) behaviour.
As emphasized in many Quantum Mechanics (hereafter QM) text books,
and in particular in the first chapter of Quantum Mechanics by Landau and
Lifchitz [1], QM has thus to be based on motion concepts fundamentally dif-
ferent from those of classical mechanics: “In QM, the notion of a trajectory
does not exist. This is expressed by the uncertainty principle, which Heisenberg
discovered in 1927 1”. This book first appeared in 1966, but it is not discussed
1 Likemany physicists nowadays, I would prefer “undetermination “ to “uncertainty”
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in Nancy Cartwright’s book [2] (published in 1983) How the Laws of Physics
Lie . In particular the last chapter entitled : How the Measurement Problem is
an Artefact of Mathematics is of interest in this context.
In this paper, I will examine the various theses developed in that chapter
of her book. I will argue that her position that “transition probabilities are
fundamental” although correct in certain areas of physics, ignores a vast amount
of facts which prove that this position is incorrect in general. As discussed
below, I claim that this is due to the failure to accept the funny logic of QM;
furthermore, I will argue that Cartwright does not identify correctly one of the
last fundamental unsolved problems of QM nowadays: the duality of a world
where quantum behaviour coexists with classical behaviour. A problem on
which results obtained in the last few years [3, 4] have allowed perhaps decisive
progress. This should be taken into account in the philosophical debate about
QM.
The question of how classical behaviour emerges from a set of interacting
quantum particles is an actively debated one [19]. I am not interested in the
relevant theoretical issue here. This paper is not discussing decoherence. The
latter may suppress interferences, but is well known not to solve the question
of the “single pointer position” of the classical object, as described below. The
aspect I am underlining here is that the recent experiments mentioned in the
last paragraph provide new evidence for the classical /quantum duality of our
world, as well as for the Copenhaguen School interpretation of QM.
The structure of the paper follows at first that of Nancy Cartwright’s chapter
on the measurement problem in her book (reference [2]). Section 2 states the
position of the measurement problem in QM, based on exact quotations from
active members of the Copenhagen School, and lists Cartwright’s theses. Section
3 discusses the topic of the quantum state. Section 4 deals with Cartwright’s
main thesis about transition probabilities in QM. Section 5 discusses the notion
of the measurement problem as an artefact of mathematics, as proposed by
Cartwright. Section 6 deals with the duality of the quantum and of the classical
world.
One crucial issue discussed in the course of this study is that of the coexis-
tence of contraries within objects of nature. I have felt useful and necessary to
add to the study of Nancy Cartwright’s proposal a discussion (section 7) on the
scope, validity and limits of the aristotelian principle of non contradiction, and
on some basic notions of dialectical materialism.
2 The measurement problem
The title of this chapter, i.e. How the measurement problem is an artefact of
the mathematics, sets the stage. Referring to von Neumann’s work of 1932
[5], there are two kinds of evolution in the quantum theory; one is governed
by Schroedinger’s equation, which is continuous and deterministic; the other is
the reduction of the wave packet, which is discontinuous and indeterministic.
Cartwright’s goal along all this chapter is to deny this duality. The following is
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a quote of the introduction to the chapter2:
...Most of the time systems are governed by the Schroedinger equa-
tion. Reduction occurs when and only when a measurements is
made. How then do measurements differ from other interactions
between systems? It turns out to be very difficult to find any differ-
ence that singles out measurements uniquely. Von Neumann postu-
lated that measurements are special because they involve a conscious
observer.... I think that this is the only solution that succeeds in
picking measurements from all other interactions. It is clearly not
a satisfactory solution...3 I will argue here that the measurement
problem is not a real problem. There is nothing special about mea-
surement. Reductions of the wave packet occur in a variety of other
circumstances as well, indeterministically and on their own, without
the need for any conscious intervention...On the conventional inter-
pretation, which takes position probabilities as primary, quantum
propositions have a peculiar logic4, or a peculiar probability struc-
ture or both. But transition probabilities where reduction of the
wave packet occur, have both a standard logic and a standard
probability. They provide a non problematic interpretation of the
theory.
The proposal to develop an interpretation for quantum mechanics
based on transition probabilities seems to me exactly right.
In her attempt to justify this interpretation, the author encounters however
a difficulty:
Two kinds of evolution are postulated. Reductions of the wave packet
are no longer confined to measurements, but when do they occur? If
there are two different kinds of change, there must be some feature
which dictates which situation will be governed by Schroedinger’s law,
and which by the projection postulate.
Eventually, she urges that
the two evolutions are not different in nature; their difference is an
artefact of the conventional notation.
In the following, I will describe a different proposal, which was actually
clearly exposed by brilliant members of the Bohr Copenhagen school, such as
Lev Landau. Some readers will frown and accuse me of being conservative and
conformist. It turns out that very recent experiments, which will be discussed
in section 6 add new evidence in favour of the Copenhagen interpretation, as
2P. 163 of reference [2].
3This passage shows that the author adopts a rational position and rejects the idealistic
interpretations of QM. I fully agree with her on this, which will not be addressed further in
this paper.
4bold type here is by me, as in the other bold type quotations in this paper.
4
detailed below. Disregarding those new experiments would be a mistake. The
proposal formulated in this paper is based on the full recognition that QM is a
bona fide example of a different logic, a logic which is at work in nature, and
which is at variance with the traditional Aristotle prohibition of contradictions;
a logic which led Bohr to adopt as motto: Contraria sunt complementa.
My view is that Nancy Cartwright’s failed attempt at denying the duality
at the core of QM is based in part on the failure to recognize the nature of this
duality, and in part on the influence on her thinking of the dominant rejection of
a logic which admits contradictions in epistemics, as imposed by contradictions
within objects of nature5.
3 In defence of reduction of the wave packet
In her section “In defence of reduction of the wave packet “, the author first
describes in more details the difficulty with the measurement problem. This
difficulty is met by all authors who believe that the Schroedinger equation is
the only fundamental equation, governing all objects of the universe, which
usually leads to ideas of parallel universes, and in the end, to the position that
there is no possibility of knowing the world [12]. Nancy Cartwright does not
share this position, but her proposal to solve the problem is unacceptable, as I
will argue in this paper.
In this section, she describes the current reasoning about the interaction of
a quantum particle – such as an electron – with a “macroscopic” body. Quoting
Cartwright:
...It is possible for macroscopic objects to be in states with well de-
fined values for all macroscopic observables... But interactions with
microscopic objects bring them into superpositions. The electron
starts out in a superposition with the apparatus in its ground state6
Together the composite of the two finishes after the measurements
in a superposition, where the pointer of the apparatus has no well
defined position but is distributed across the dial...After the mea-
surement has ceased, a new kind of change occurs. The superposed
state of the apparatus-plus-object reduces to one of the components
of the superposition. This kind of change is called the “reduction of
the wave packet”, and the principle that governs it is the “projection
postulate”.
For clarity, let me quote in the following how Landau and Lifchitz describe
this 7, with an added crucial statement (hereafter in bold letters):
5In that respect, Nancy Cartwright is part of a large family of positivist or neo-positivist
philosophers, such as Duhem [6], whom she quotes approvingly in her book, Carnap [7], Kuhn
[8], Van Fraassen [9], Popper [10], Lakatos [11], etc.. Those will not be discussed further in
this paper
6In fact in an initial state, not necessarily the groud state.
7p. 32 of reference [1].
5
Consider a system with two parts: a classical apparatus and an elec-
tron (a quantum object). The measurement process is defined by
their interaction, the apparatus changes from its initial state to an-
other state; this change allows to study the electron state. The states
of the apparatus are characterized by certain physical values, denoted
by g, with eigenvalues gn. For simplicity the spectrum of the gn is
supposed to be discrete. The states of the apparatus are noted Φn(ξ),
where n corresponds to the apparatus “pointer position” gn, and ξ is
the set of its coordinates; The classical character of the apparatus
is expressed by the fact that we are certain that, at all time, it is
in one of its known states Φ(n) with a certain determined value
g.
Let Φ0(ξ) the apparatus initial state wave function (before measure-
ment) and Ψ(q) a certain electron initial wave function (q is the
set of its coordinates). These functions describe independently the
states of the apparatus and of the electron, and thus the initial wave
function of the whole system (before interaction) is the product
Ψ(q)Φ0(ξ) (1)
When the apparatus and the electron interact, QM allows in princi-
ple to follow the time variation of the whole system wave function.
After the measurement process, expanding the latter in terms of the
apparatus complete set of wave functions, we get a superposition of
the form: ∑
n
An(q)Φn(ξ), (2)
the An(q) being certain functions of q 8
This is the time for the apparatus “classicism” to enter the stage,
as well as the classical mechanics duality, as limiting case, and, at
the same time, foundation of Quantum Mechanics. Thanks to the
classical character of the apparatus the quantity g has a determined
value (“the apparatus pointer position”) at each time. Thus we can
state that the apparatus+electron system state will not be described
by a sum such as equation (2), but by a single term which corresponds
to the “apparatus pointer position” gn, i.e.
An(q)Φn(ξ) (3)
The text then proceeds to demonstrating that the An(q) have to be of the
form
An(q) = anφn(q) (4)
8See the introduction to reference [1]
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the φn are the normalized electron wave functions, after the measure, and an
are the only constants which depend on the initial state Ψ(q)9
an =
∫
Ψ(q)Ψ∗n(q)dq (5)
where the Ψn(q) form a complete set of orthonormal functions which depend on
the measurement process.
The bold type sentences seem to me the fundamental issue which allows
to understand the dual combination of the Schroedinger equation and of the
projection postulate about the measurement process. Namely the postulate
that there exists in the world objects which obey classical laws of motion, and
others which obey QM. This postulate is coherent with the fact that classical
mechanics is both a limiting case, and, at the same time, the foundation of
Quantum Mechanics. This issue is addressed later on in this work. I argue that
the Copenhagen school has correctly suggested the solution, i.e. quantum versus
classical, which, incidentally, is not synonymous with the opposition between
microscopic and macroscopic, as emphasized in ref. [1]. Recent experiments
[3, 4] have shed new light on this issue, and led to the Nobel Prize awarded to
Serge Haroche and David Wineland.
In the remaining parts of the section 1 of the chapter, Cartwright attempts to
show that the Schroedinger equation cannot be the basic equation of the world,
since interactions lead to vastly complicated entangled states. Her conclusion
of this section is that reduction of the wave packet must occur quite generally.
But she does not acknowledge that “measurement”, and “reduction of the wave
packet” may occur anytime a quantum entity interacts with a classical one. She
rather ascribes this to interaction with macroscopic objects. This is not a minor
point. Macroscopicity is not the issue. There are macroscopic quantum objects,
such as superconducting states, Quantum Hall states or neutron stars, etc.. The
issue is quantum vs classical. In the Haroche group experiments, the classical
object is reduced to a hundred atoms!
4 Are transition probabilities fundamental?
The section 2 of the chapter is entitled “Why transition probabilities are fun-
damental”. It starts by an account of the two-slit experiment: electrons are
directed from a source to a photographic plate but there is an opaque screen
between the source and the plate. The screen is pierced by two conveniently
spaced slits, noted 1 and 2. The amplitude to move from the source to a given
point x on the screen is a1(x) if only slit 1 is open. It is a2(x) if only slit 2 is
open. When both slits are open, the total amplitude is S(x) = a1(x) + a2(x).
Both amplitudes are derived from the Schroedinger equation. the sum S is
the standard QM result due to the linearity of the Schroedinger equation. The
9In this paper, I refer indifferently to the “quantum state” and to the “wave function”.
Technically, the wave function is the expression in real space, < ~r|ψ > of the quantum state
|ψ > in Dirac notation. This has no bearing on the topic of this work.
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probability for an electron to hit the screen at x when both slits are open is
|S|2 = |a1(x)|2 + |a2(x)|2 + a1(x)∗a2(x) + a1(x)a2(x)∗. The last two terms are
interference terms: when both slits are open, the result for |S|2 is not the sum
for the processes when only one slit in turn is open. This example is a simplified
version of the electron diffraction by a crystal: it accounts satisfactorily for the
experimental results; it shows that consideration of probabilities only, inspired
by the conventional classical logic, is an error. The possibility of interferences
is a fact of life as far as quantum entities are concerned. Cartwright, on the
other hand, is not satisfied, because her logic prohibits the possibility that a
single particle traverses the screen simultaneously through both slits. It seems
to me that this reflects her difficulty in accepting that the classical trajectory
notion breaks down for quantum entities. She spends several pages reviewing
various proposals by philosophers, who, like her, do not want to consider am-
plitudes or wave functions as a fundamental object of QM, and who struggle
with the interference term which seems to reflect a “funny logic”, at variance
with the traditional one based on classical mechanics trajectories. In the course
of this discussion she reveals a misconception about QM rules for addition of
amplitudes. She writes:
...It supposes that the electron passes through neither one slit nor the
other when we are not looking. When we do look, suddenly, there,
it is either at the top slit or at the bottom. What is special about
looking that causes objects to be at places where they would not have
been otherwise?
“Looking through which slit the electron passes” is detecting it through some
interaction with some material means. For example, a photon scattered by the
electron at one slit. In that case, as explained in the first pages of Feynman’s
Lecture Notes on QM [13], one cannot sum the amplitudes for passing through
slit 1 and slit 2, because the final states at the screen are not identical: there is
a scattered photon in one final state, and none in the other. In fact, whenever
an inelastic process occurs along one path, the corresponding amplitude cannot
be added to the other amplitude, and no interference effect results from this
path. Summing over amplitudes for a given process requires the initial state
and the final state for all paths to be identical. When writing a paper about
the measurement problem, it would seem necessary to acknowledge this fact...
However, unhappy about all proposals to understand the two-slit experiment
and the funny quantum logic exhibited by the interference term, the author
proposes10
a more radical alternative. I want to eliminate position probabilities
altogether, and along with them the probabilities for all classical dy-
namical quantities. The only real probabilities in QM, I maintain,
are transition probabilities ...
I shall illustrate this with a couple of examples: the first, exponen-
tial decay; and the second, the scattering of a moving particle by a
10p. 179, reference[2]
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stationary target; etc..
Let us admit that exponential decay, or particle scattering by a stationary
target, or maybe a number of other phenomena can be dealt with by looking at
transition probabilities. Using a few examples as proof of a universal statement
( The only real probabilities in QM are transition probabilities ) is not accept-
able. Should not Hume’s warnings [14] about induction prevent us from such
a reasoning? In the following I’ll give counter examples which show that no
generalization of the sort Cartwright advocates is allowed.
She adds furthermore11:
I have been urging that the interpretation of quantum mechanics
should be entirely in term of transition probabilities. When no tran-
sitions occur, ψ must remain uninterpreted or have only a subjunc-
tive12 interpretation.
This is another incorrect stand, which I will show in a later section to be
contrary to a number of examples. Another disputable position is quoted, in line
with similar statements in the chapter 13: “Henry Margenau has long urged that
all quantum measurements are ultimately measurements of position”. The only
canonical conjugates Cartwright ever considers in this chapter are momentum
and position, which are related through the indetermination relation [q, p] = ih¯.
What about the transverse components of the angular momentum, related by
[lx, ly] = ilz? What about the relation between the guiding center coordinates
Rx, Ry of the electron motion under magnetic field in two dimensions [15], which
are related by [Rx, Ry] = il2B, where lB is the magnetic length? What about
the undetermination relation connexion of energy and time14? What about
the canonical conjugation of phase φ and number N which is at the basis of
phase coherence in coherent optics, superconductivity [16], etc..? Whenever
two dynamic quantities are expressed as Q, and αd/dQ where α is a constant,
such quantities are canonical conjugates. In other words, eliminating the “funny
logic” of QM by eliminating position probabilities leaves unsolved the “funny
logic” at work in all canonically conjugate quantities.
5 Is the measurement problem an artefact of
mathematics?
The last section of the chapter is entitled : How the measurement problem is
an artefact of the mathematics. It starts with the following statement;
Reduction of the wave packet goes on all the time, in a wide va-
riety of circumstances. There is nothing peculiar about measure-
ment...The measurement problem has disappeared. But it seems that
11p.186, ibid.
12misprint? subjective seems more correct.
13p. 182, ibid.
14Energy and time are not canonical conjugate. I thank Jean-Noël Fuchs for a remark about
this.
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another has replaced it. Two kinds of evolution are still postulated:
Schroedinger evolution and reduction of the wave packet. The latter
is not restricted to measurement type situations, but when does it
occur? What features determine when a system will evolve in ac-
cord with the Schroedinger equation, and when its wave packet will
be reduced? I call this15 the characterization problem.
Contrast this with the very first pages of reference [1]:
A measurement, in QM, describes any interaction process between a
classical entity and a quantum one.
We have defined the apparatus as a physical entity which obeys classi-
cal mechanics with sufficient accuracy. Such as, for example, a body
with a sufficiently large mass. But it would be incorrect to deduce
from this that macroscopicity is a compulsory feature of the appa-
ratus...The role of apparatus may be played by a microscopic entity,
since “sufficient accuracy” depends on the actual problem at hand.
Comparing the two quotations above, one concludes that both agree with
the notion that reduction of the wave packet occurs all the time. However Nancy
Cartwright does not consider the quantum-classical duality as a relevant notion,
contrary to the Copenhagen school, as expressed by the quotation in section 3.
The section then proceeds by examining various attempts, such as dealing
with the system sizes, to solve the “characterization problem”, only to find out
they do not succeed. Eventually, the author states:
Sheer size cannot solve the characterization problem as I have laid
out... it is a pseudo problem. The characterization problem is
an artefact of mathematics. There is no real problem because16
there are not two different kinds of evolution in QM. There are evo-
lutions that are correctly described by the Schroedinger equation, and
there are evolutions that are correctly described by something like von
Neumann’s projection postulate. But these are not different kinds in
any physically relevant sense. We think they are because of the way
we write the theory.
In the remainder of this chapter, the author attempts to justify this position
by invoking quantum field theory and by suggesting that using non unitary
evolution operators in the former would eventually prove her point.
There is little doubt that quantum field theory is a useful tool to treat the
physics of large numbers of identical particles such as fermions or bosons; sta-
tistical averages over a large number of particles governed by the Schroedinger
evolution operator do not depend on the reduction of single particle wave pack-
ets. However, quantum field theory is of little help in the physics of a small
number of quantum particles. Nowadays, technological and fundamental sci-
ence progress allows to measure single atoms irradiated with a few photons [4]
15P. 196, ibid. Underlined by me.
16P. 198, ibid. Underlined by me.
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or to explore states with a few photons using single atoms 17 [3]. It may be
that the program described by Nancy Cartwright succeeds, but its results do
not solve either the “characterization problem” or its origin, namely the duality
that she claims she has eliminated, because she has not clearly identified its
essence.
6 The origin of duality: quantum world vs clas-
sical world
The Copenhagen group has clearly expressed – as shown by the quotation above
from reference [1] – the view that quantum mechanics cannot exist without the
classical world. The introduction of this book [1] states
Ordinarily, a more general theory can be formulated in a logically
closed way, independently of a less general one. Relativity theory,
for example, is built on fundamental principles without resorting to
newtonian concepts. As for the formulation of the fundamental prin-
ciples of quantum mechanics, it is basically impossible without the
intervention of classical mechanics...It is clear that in a system built
exclusively on quantum entities, there would be no possibility of for-
mulating logically closed mechanics.
This statement deserves thorough consideration. Classical mechanics has
been built over the years since Galilee. It embodies a large amount of theoret-
ical and experimental successes, of successful predictions, as well as infinitely
many applications. Hamiltonians and Lagrangians are fundamental constructs
of classical physics; they are fundamental to develop any QM investigation.
The theorist starts with the the expression of the classical Hamiltonian, or La-
grangian, of a system and proceeds by quantizing it, i. e. by introducing the
conjugation relations between position and momentum, and/or between com-
ponents of the angular momentum, etc..
However, do we fully understand today under what condition an entity will
behave classically, so that the superposition due to its interaction with a quan-
tum one will end up in a single state, with the “single indication of the ap-
paratus”? The usual answer is that when the action of a system is very large
compared to h¯, it behaves classically [18]. But this is not the whole story. We
know various examples of macroscopic quantum states, such as the BCS ground
state [16], the quantum Hall states [15, 17], various superfluid states, Bose con-
densates, neutron stars, etc., so that macroscopicity cannot be the universal
answer.
Recent experiments conducted in École Normale Supérieure in Paris [3] shed
a bright light on the issues discussed by Nancy Cartwright, and do not support
her view that “the laws of physics lie”, or, for that matter, that the “mea-
surement problem is an artefact of mathematics”. In those experiments, a few
17typically the number of photons is of order 10.
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photons are trapped in a cavity in a coherent superposition state with a spread
in the number N of photons, and a fixed phase φ, following the canonical uncer-
tainty relation between phase φ and number N , i.e. ∆φ.∆N ≈ 1. Conveniently
prepared Rydberg atoms are then shot one by one through the cavity where they
interact with the electromagnetic field, which alters their energy levels depend-
ing on the number of photons which have interacted with the atom inside the
cavity18. This perturbation is analysed when the atoms emerge from the cavity,
so that the number of photons in the cavity is determined. What is found is
that this number first fluctuates with the first atoms; the distribution of states
according to the number of photons is found to obey a Poisson distribution of
probabilities; then the number of photons fluctuates less and less as more atoms
are shot through the cavity, until, after about 100 atoms, a single number is
found to be stabilized. In other words, the quantum state of photons inside the
cavity is projected by its repeated interaction with the atoms in a pure state
with a fixed number of photons, while its phase becomes undetermined. The
interpretation of this experiment is that the “classical entity” which projects the
superposition of states into a pure state is the set of about 100 atoms which have
been shot through the cavity. On top of this, the experiment allows to follow
how this “classicism” gradually appears as the number of atoms increases. Once
a pure state is created, any later measurement finds it remains unchanged, as
QM text books teach. Other experiments on entangled states made of two level
atoms and superposed photon states allow to give flesh to a “photon-made”
Schroedinger cat19, etc..
Such results on single quantum entities built out of a few units of quantum
particles vindicate the “funny quantum logic” which Nancy Cartwright urges to
forget in favour of the Boolean familiar classical logic of transition probabilities.
Bohr’s motto is an expression which states that contraries “complement” each
other; I interpret it20 as a statement about the contradictory unit formed by
particle and wave, i.e. a contradiction between continuity and discontinuity.
Bohr’s motto is quite different from Aristotle’s statement : “contraries exclude
one another”. In QM, both terms coexist, and either term of the contradiction
dominates depending on the experimental conditions. Wave character and cor-
puscular character of a quantum particle are two contradictory aspects which
are simultaneously present and unavoidable in the rational analysis of QM ex-
periments. In fact, the notion of wave packet – a superposition of plane waves
which may result in a localization of the particle – shows that either aspect
may dominate depending of the superposition: an infinite sum of plane waves
describes a point-like particle; the two contradictory features become, in some
sense identical. In fact, in my view, the main reason why Nancy Cartwright is
proved wrong so convincingly by experiments is her philosophical blindness to
the “funny logic” which admits inner contradictions within entities as a possible
18See reference [19] for more details
19An illuminating talk in French by Serge Haroche in Ecole Polytechnique in 2014 is highly
recommended.
20Such was not Bohr’s position.
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(general?) mode of existence of reality21. The quotation in bold type in section
2 exhibits a solid faith in “standard logic”, as a decisive cause for her “defence of
transition probabilities”. Standard logic is the Aristotelian logic which prohibits
contradiction within the thing: “A cannot be non A”. The value and limits of va-
lidity of this “no-contradiction” principle is discussed in more details in section
7.
The point of view following which the only equation governing the world
is the Schroedinger equation (see for example references [12, 20]) is somewhat
different from Nancy Cartwright’s. In this “Schroedinger only” point of view, in-
finitely many worlds coexist and develop in infinitely many superposition states.
This position also denies the duality discussed above. It disregards the impossi-
bility of funding QM without classical mechanics. It results in the impossibility
of establishing any truth about the world we live in. Such theories and philoso-
phies will have a hard time arguing away the results described above. The ex-
istence of objects obeying classical mechanics is a theoretical and experimental
achievement of mankind which should not be dismissed because of the existence
of objects obeying QM.
Another debatable issue is Nancy Cartwright’s stand that when there are no
transition probabilities, the wave function cannot be given any interpretation.
To begin with, the existence of quantum states is dictated by the breakdown of
the classical notion of trajectory at the microscopic level. The quantum state,
which contains necessarily less information than the simultaneous existence of
position q and momentum p in classical mechanics, replaces those two entities as
the best possible theoretical entity when the former do not exist simultaneously.
No transition probability can be inferred without the notion of quantum state.
But is the quantum state, and its space description, the wave function, only
a “theoretical entity”? I urge to consider the wave function as a bona fide
real entity. Consider the structure of molecules, which can now be observed in
detail one by one by various techniques. Not only are their shape and spatial
structure dictated by the shape of the atomic wave functions, but knowledge of
the latter allows to build taylor made atomic complexes with the desired shape
or chemical activity. Hacking [22] 22 considers practice as a decisive test of
reality for theoretical entities. If he is right – as I believe he is – atomic wave
functions have to be considered as facts of life, which are used practically to
create specific molecules.23
Macroscopic quantum objects, such as a piece of superconducting metal, are
endowed with a macroscopic coherent ground state wave function which has a
fluctuating total number of particles and a fixed phase24. The latter leads to
such devices as SQUIDS [23] which are spectacularly accurate, among other
things, in measuring very small magnetic field intensities25, in accounting for
21See for example references [21] for a more detailed discussion on the dialectics of nature
22more than hundred years after Marx...
23The question of many body states which are mathematically written in very large space
dimensions requires a special discussion, which is not treated in this paper.
24The superconducting phase breaks electromagnetic gauge invariance.
25such as magnetic fields produced by the nervous system in the human brain.
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the Meissner effect, or the occurrence of quantized filaments of flux (vortices)
in a superconductor submitted to a magnetic field, etc.. All such effects empiri-
cally well known and theoretically well understood do not depend on transition
rates, but on the structure of the macroscopic wave function. The basic expla-
nation of the Quantum Hall Effects is based on the wave function derived by
Laughlin [17]. The latter, in the case of the fractional version of the Hall effects,
led to the prediction (and subsequent observation) of fractionally charged parti-
cles in the fractional quantum Hall state, by straightforward examination of the
wave function phase. Another example is the vanishing longitudinal resistivity
which coincides with the quantum Hall transverse resistivity plateaux: it is due
to the absence of any scattering process (i.e. any transition) for the electron
in a chiral surface state...Those examples are sufficient to establish that Nancy
Cartwright’s position on the lack of meaning of the wave function when no tran-
sition rates are available is not supported by a number of successful explanatory
theories with practical applications.
7 Limits of the no-contradiction principle
At this stage, I feel it is necessary to spend a few lines on the question of the
“contradiction within objects of nature” which I have mentioned too briefly
above. If what I am writing below appears irrational, and in particular if the
notion of unity of contraries in the epistemics and ontology of objects of nature
still appears as unacceptable, my analysis of the reasons for Nancy Cartwright’s
positions on QM will fail to convince too. There is currently a large sector
among philosophers and in particular philosophers of science who consider the
“no-contradiction principle” established by Aristotle has such a validity that any
mention of coexistence and - worse -, identity of contraries in objects of nature is
immediately rejected by many, with no hesitation or discussion. There are very
good reasons for this position. But there are also good reasons to reconsider it
in view of some arguments I discuss now.
The history of dialectical thinking is about three thousand years old [21].That
some truth may be expressed in a contradiction is at the heart of the most an-
cient philosophies in China, India, Greece, from Lao-Tseu to Heraklite 26. This
was radically dismissed by Aristotle 27, in the name of a logic he established [25].
Dialectical thinking was banished in the western world as detrimental to social
order, or even the possibility of communication. A crucial point is that the no-
contradiction principle is based on an ontological postulate, i.e. the invariance of
the essence. Masked by the universal sensible change in our sublunar world, the
latter is nevertheless – says Aristotle – the ultimate truth of the being[21, 25].
Then Kant, at the time of the French Revolution [26] finds out that the
26Example from Heraklite: “ It is impossible to bathe twice in the same river”
27Aristotle : “the same cannot belong and simultaneously not belong to the same simul-
taneously and under the same connection”(ontology); “contradictory statements cannot be
simultaneously true” (logic); “nobody can believe that the same could be simultaneously be
and not be”(psychology)
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century old efforts of metaphysics result in fundamental and unsolvable contra-
dictions, which he dubbed antinomies. The latter, says Kant, are a sign of a
fundamental limitation of our understanding.
Then Hegel [27] takes a bold new stand: if all quest for truth inevitably
results in a contradiction, then contradiction is the truth!
For Hegel, dialectics is not illogical, it is logic developed beyond the limits
of aristotelian logic. The no-contradiction principle appears to be relevant for
the invariant, the inert thing, but it is in great difficulty to think connections
and processes, as illustrated by the problems posed since ancient times by the
simple motion of an arrow. Hegel’s ideas caused enormous interest in Europe
in the 19th century, as well as fierce opposition, in particular by the catholic
church, for which Hegel is a pantheist, or worse, an atheist28. The third Empire
in France banishes Hegel’s ideas from Academia. In turn the working class
movement and the rise of socialist thinking triggered a revival of hegelian studies.
Marx [28] adopted hegelian dialectics, but rejected the idealist hegelian position
following which the Concept precedes reality; for him, dialectics appear in the
theory of knowledge as a result of dialectics in the objective world. Engels [29]
develops dialectical materialism, formulates laws thereof; at first dialectics is
for him objective inasmuch as it is imposed by reality to our subjective logic;
later he reaches a disputable position: dialectical materialism becomes, in a
pure ontological way the science of the general laws of motion of the external
world as well as those of human thought[30]: this thesis dismisses the essential
epistemic aspect of dialectics and eventually opens the way to the catastrophic
version of stalinist dogmatism.
After the defeat of nazism, dialectical materialism became an important
philosophical current. Most serious philosophers in Europe, Asia and elsewhere
adopted it, in one version or another. This success led to its demise. It suffered
a severe blow when it was used as official state philosophy in the USSR. Much to
the contrary, nothing, in the founding philosophical writings [28, 29, 31] allowed
to justify turning them into an official State philosophy. This produced such
catastrophies as the State support for Lyssenko’s theories, based on the notion
that genetics was a bourgeois science, while lamarckian concepts were defined
at the government level as correct from the point of view of a caricature of
dialectical materialism. It is understandable that such nonsense in the name of
a philosophical thesis turned the latter into a questionable construction in the
eyes of many.
Dialectic materialism itself is an open system, which has no lesson to teach
beforehand about specific objects of knowledge, and insists [29] on taking into
account all lessons taught by the advancement of science.
It is perhaps time for a serious critical assessment of this philosophical thesis.
The possibility of general theoretical statements about the empirical world is
not a negligible question.
Materialism gives a clear answer to the "‘gnoseological problem of the rela-
28I cannot review here those developments, for want of space. Interested readers are invited
to read, for example, the recent book by Séve (chapter IV) [21].
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tionship between thought and existence, between sense-data and the world...Matter
is that which, acting on our senses, produces sensations.” This was written in
1908 by Lenin [31]. It may look too simple when technology (such as that used
in QM experiments) is intercalated between matter (the electrons in the two
slit experiment) and the screens on which we read their impact. Technology or
not, matter is the external source of our sensations. So much for materialism.
Dialectical materialism adds a fundamental aspect i.e. that theories are led
to analyze reality in terms of contraries which coexist and compete with each
other within things in Nature. Depending on which dominates the competition
(contradiction) under what conditions, the causal chains originating from the
thing and causing phenomena will take different forms, which are reflected in
theories. Epistemics and ontology are intimately intertwined [32].
Consider an example of how formal logic and dialectical logic complete and
enrich each other: that of cause and effect. A moving billiard ball 1 hits a
motionless billiard ball 2 which is thus set in motion. The motion of 1 is the
cause for the motion of 2, which is the effect. Cause and effect are two contraries
of a logic of identity: their meaning is clear, the relation is uni-directional: there
seems to be no room left for contradiction. However, if the collision has caused
the motion of 2, due to that of 1, the trajectory, energy and velocity of 1
have also been changed; to the initial causal relationship wherein 1 is a cause
for 2 is added necessarily an inverse causal effect wherein 2 becomes a cause
for the motion of 1. The uni-directional causal relation we had first is turned
immediately into a reciprocal relation: a cause leading to a consequence is in
turn affected by the consequence turned into a cause itself. Can’t we see here
an example of unity of contraries? The classical logician will deny it, observing
that there is no contradiction, but interaction: coincidence of two causal actions
which remain distinct causal ones. However, how can we distinguish within the
collision the causal action of 1 on 2 and that of 2 on 1?
Another example is given by Aristotle’s fundamental categories such as qual-
ity and quantity. In the classical logic, those two categories are clearly distinct
and form a couple of well identified contraries. But there is a host of empirical
evidence that there is no such dichotomy : quantity may transform into quality
almost universally; think of all examples of spontaneous symmetry breaking, for
example. More trivially, one sleeping pill puts one to sleep, hundred kill her,
etc..
What I have discussed in this paper, about Nancy Cartwright’s views on
QM has its origin in the long lasting historical conflicting views since Newton
and Fresnel between the corpuscular or wave-like nature of light. We know now
that this theoretical contradiction has been solved by QM 29 which takes into
account what experiments teach us: corpuscular and wave-like aspects coexist
and unite in the quantum behaviour of particles. A fact (a “ funny logic”), that,
seemingly, Nancy Cartwright, true to a classical aristotelian logic, is unable to
accept.
29In hegelian terms, the wave packet is an example of “Aufhebung”: contraries interpene-
trate each other and overcome (“aufheben”) the contradiction
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8 Conclusion
In addition to questioning critically Nancy Cartwright’s position on the measure-
ment problem, on the wave function, and on the fundamental role she advocates
for transition rates, the results mentioned above suggest rather convincingly
that “laws of physics” (for example the Schroedinger equation) do tell truths
about the world... Are such truths absolute ones? Given definite experimental
conditions and technological stages of development, the answer cannot be but
positive. For example the appearance of superconductivity below such and such
temperature at ordinary pressure in such and such materials, or the appearance
of quantum Hall effects, etc., not to speak of QM itself. So those absolute truths
are also relative ones. Technological improvements, better accuracy of measure-
ments, different experimental parameters, might and most probably will enrich
them by discoveries of new phenomena, of new behaviours of matter, so that our
representation of the world will evolve, without falsifying the absolute/relative
truths mentioned above. On the other hand, some truths have so to speak a
higher degree of truth, inasmuch as they are true whatever happens in the fu-
ture: think of Noether’s theorem, for example: the invariance of a system under
a symmetry ensures the conservation of a corresponding entity in this system.
I have argued that Nancy Cartwright does not identify correctly either the
contradiction within QM, or the (related) dual nature of quantum evolutions
(Schroedinger equation and reduction of the wave packet). She tries to argue it
away by invoking an artefact of mathematics. This dual nature has its origin in
the duality of our world where quantum objects and classical ones coexist and
interact. The recent experiments I have described confirm the Bohr Copenhagen
interpretation of QM. There remains to establish more generally under what
conditions an object behaves classically or according to quantum mechanics.
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